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ON THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL 
DOXASTIC ATTITUDES 
Tjerk GAUDERIS 
ABSTRACT: In the literature on doxastic attitudes, the notion ‘belief’ is used in both a 
coarse-grained and a fine-grained manner. While the coarse-grained notion of ‘belief,’ as 
the doxastic attitude that expresses any form of assent to its content, is a useful technical 
concept, the fine-grained notion, which tries to capture the folk notion of ‘belief’ in 
contrast with other doxastic concepts such as ‘acceptance’ or ‘degrees of confidence,’ is 
utterly ambiguous. In order to dispel this ambiguity, I introduce first a new framework 
for describing doxastic attitudes that does not rely on a specific fine-grained primitive 
notion of ‘belief.’ This framework distinguishes two different doxastic attitudes, i.e. the 
theoretical and the practical, and explains how various doxastic concepts such as 
‘accepting,’ ‘having a degree of confidence’ and the folk notion of ‘belief’ all describe a 
particular interpretation of one or both of the distinguished doxastic attitudes. Next, by 
focusing on ongoing debates over the difference between ‘acceptance’ and ‘belief’ on the 
one hand and between ‘degrees of confidence’ and ‘(plain) belief’ on the other, I argue 
that much precision can be gained in philosophical analysis by taking a reductionist 
stance concerning any specific fine-grained and primitive notion of ‘belief.’ 
KEYWORDS: doxastic attitudes, belief, acceptance, degrees of confidence, 
degrees of belief 
 
1. The Notion ‘Doxastic Attitude’ 
The notion of a doxastic attitude entered the general epistemology literature in the 
late 1970s, especially via the works of Goldman,1 who used it to describe in a 
generic way the propositional attitude of either belief or disbelief. Since the 1980s, 
the notion has become more widely used for this purpose, though one generally 
now adds a third option of withholding belief or suspending judgment.2 In this 
way, doxastic attitudes have come to be understood as the three possible attitudes 
                                                                
1 See e.g. Alvin Goldman, “Epistemics: the Regulative Theory of Cognition,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 75, 10 (1978): 515; Alvin Goldman, “Epistemology and the Psychology of Belief,” 
The Monist 61, 4 (1978): 525; Alvin Goldman, “Varieties of Cognitive Appraisal,” Noûs 13, 1 
(1979): 23. 
2 See e.g. Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies 48, 1 (1985): 
15; Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 126; 
Matthias Steup, “Doxastic Freedom,” Synthese 161, 3 (2008): 375. 
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an agent can intellectually adopt towards a proposition after considering it, a view 
which has also been called Triad.3 
As the notion ‘doxastic attitude’ gained currency, several authors started to 
also use it to describe a broader class of belief-like attitudes similar but not 
identical to the attitude of belief. From his Bayesian stance, Kaplan started this 
evolution by calling degrees of confidence – also often referred to as degrees of 
belief – doxastic attitudes.4 The attitude of acceptance, which was introduced in 
the literature by Van Fraassen,5 also generally came to be regarded as a doxastic 
attitude.6 Kapitan called the attitudes of presuming, feeling and taking for granted 
lower-level doxastic attitudes: unlike ‘belief,’ these notions do not imply the 
agent’s ability to articulate their content explicitly.7 Williams even extended the 
idea further by calling hypothesizing and suspecting doxastic attitudes.8 
Already in 1983, Searle argued for the need to consider these belief-like 
attitudes, for some purposes, as a single category, and grouped them under the 
label BEL, in contrast with desire-like attitudes, which he called DES.9 Williams 
made the same distinction, but named his groups ‘doxastic attitudes’ and ‘orectic 
attitudes.’10 Leaving aside the question of whether all propositional attitudes can 
be reduced to (a combination of) elements of these two groups, it is commonly 
accepted in contemporary epistemology that ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are two basic 
exemplars, each of them representative of and (for many purposes) 
interchangeable with a large group of similar propositional attitudes.11 It is also 
common practice to call the group of belief-like attitudes ‘doxastic attitudes.’12 
                                                                
3 John Turri, “A Puzzle about Withholding,” Philosophical Quarterly 62, 247 (2012): 355. 
4 Mark Kaplan, “A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance”, The Journal of Philosophy 78, 6 
(1981): 310. 
5 Bas Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 4. 
6 Ruth Weintraub, “Decision-Theoretic Epistemology,” Synthese 83, 1 (1990): 165. 
7 Tomis Kapitan, “Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 36, 143 (1986): 235. 
8 S.G. Williams, “Belief, Desire and the Praxis of Reasoning,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 90 (1989): 124. 
9 John Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 29-36. 
10 Williams, “Belief, Desire and the Praxis of Reasoning,” 124. 
11 Graham Oppy, “Propositional Attitudes,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. 
Craig. (London: Routledge, 1998), http://www.rep.routledge.com/ article/V028SECT1. Accessed 
July 14, 2014. 
12 Pascal Engel, “Trust and the Doxastic Family,” Philosophical Studies 161, 1 (2012): 17; Alvin 
Goldman, “Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology”, in Social Epistemology, eds. Adrian 
Haddock, Allan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010): 2, 26. 
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As we can observe, the notion ‘belief’ has been used in two different ways 
in the literature on doxastic attitudes. On the one hand, ‘belief’ is used as a coarse-
grained technical concept designating any doxastic attitude that has an affirmative 
stance towards its content. This is the case, for instance, in the Triad position, 
mentioned above, according to which an agent chooses to take an attitude of 
assent, dissent or neutrality towards a given proposition.13 If one chooses an 
attitude of assent, it is called ‘belief,’ irrespective of the intensity, degree, purpose 
or circumstances of this assent. For many analytical purposes, this abstraction 
from situational details can safely be made. 
On the other hand, in the exploration of the various doxastic attitudes or 
belief-like attitudes, ‘belief’ is also employed as a fine-grained concept designating 
a specific doxastic attitude intuitively assumed to be more or less equivalent to a 
folk psychological notion of belief. This is clearly not the same use of ‘belief’ as in 
its coarse-grained meaning, as this fine-grained meaning is used to explain the 
other doxastic attitudes and contrast them with ‘belief’ precisely in terms of 
differences in intensity, degree, purpose or circumstances. Furthermore, as a 
general taxonomy of doxastic attitudes is lacking,14 the other belief-like attitudes 
are often defined in terms of or with respect to such a specific fine-grained notion 
of belief, which is then regarded as a primitive and the most central doxastic 
attitude.15 
While this double meaning of ‘belief’ should not itself, if properly 
conceived, pose a genuine problem, a tendency to conflate these two distinct uses 
in the literature has obscured the fact that the fine-grained notion of ‘belief’ is, 
unlike the rather precise and technical coarse-grained notion, utterly ambiguous 
and its specific distinctiveness in relation to other fine-grained doxastic attitudes is 
far from clear. As I will show, the example uses of the notion ‘belief’ in, for 
instance, the literature on ‘acceptance’ and in the literature on ‘degrees of belief,’ 
seem to point to two different fine-grained notions. 
I address these problems by proposing a taxonomy for specific doxastic 
attitudes that is not dependent on any specific fine-grained notion of ‘belief.’ I 
base this taxonomy on the idea that each agent actually has two quite distinct 
doxastic attitudes towards a given proposition, a theoretical and a practical one, 
corresponding respectively to her credence in the proposition and her policy on 
                                                                
13 According to the explanation of this position in Turri, “A Puzzle about Withholding,” 361. 
14 Although a first attempt, from a somewhat different angle, can be found in Engel, “Trust and 
the Doxastic Family,” 17-26. 
15 An exception to this is the literature on ‘degrees of belief,’ which often takes the latter as the 
central notion, and defines the notion ‘belief’ in terms of it (see Section 6). 
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accepting it. This framework, in which the primitive doxastic concepts are 
‘degrees of belief’ and ‘acceptance,’ enables me to analyze other specific fine-
grained doxastic concepts in terms of these two, including the intended meaning 
of a fine-grained notion of ‘belief,’ i.e. a meaning that tries to capture the folk 
notion of belief. It will turn out that the folk notion of belief is a complex notion 
that specifies to a certain degree both an agent’s theoretical and her practical 
doxastic attitude towards that proposition. The observed ambiguity in the use of a 
fine-grained notion of belief can therefore be attributed to the tendency of 
different authors to stress one or the other part of this dual meaning of ‘belief.’ 
After defining and explaining this doxastic framework in Sections 2 and 3, 
and using it to structure the various doxastic concepts in Section 4, I will use this 
framework in the final sections to re-assess two important debates in the literature 
on doxastic attitudes: namely the distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance’ 
(Section 5) and the distinction between ‘(plain) belief’ and ‘degrees of belief’ 
(Section 6). 
This elaboration will allow me to defend my reductionist stance to keep the 
notion of ‘belief’ philosophically only in its coarse-grained technical sense (as 
exemplified in the Triad view), while reducing it to an appropriate expression in 
terms of ‘degrees of belief’ and ‘acceptance’ in cases that require analysis of a 
particular and more specific notion of belief. 
2. Doxastic Attitudes and Doxastic Concepts 
I will start by addressing a minor conceptual issue to prevent confusion later on. 
In the literature, the notion ‘doxastic attitude’ is actually used in two senses. On 
the one hand, one can speak of the doxastic attitude of an agent towards p: 
although it gives us no further information about the nature of this attitude, 
because it is generic, it refers to the agent’s attitude itself. On the other hand, one 
can speak of, for example, ‘assuming’ as a doxastic attitude. In this case, it refers to 
the type of an agent’s doxastic attitude. I will avoid this confusion by using the 
notion ‘doxastic concept’ for the different types, and, henceforth, ‘doxastic 
attitude’ only for the generic attitude itself. In these terms, we can say, for 
example, that the nature of an agent’s doxastic attitude towards p can be specified 
by choosing an appropriate doxastic concept such as ‘accepting,’ ‘assuming,’ ‘being 
certain’ etc.16 Moreover, I will restrict my use of the term ‘concept’ to this 
technical sense and use the term ‘notion’ for general purposes. 
                                                                
16 It has been suggested to me that the type-token distinction could be used to capture this 
difference, but I am afraid that this might cause confusion here: on the one hand, a ‘doxastic 
concept’ is a specific interpretation of a generic ‘doxastic attitude’ (hinting that ‘doxastic 
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To evade reference to the notion of belief, let me define doxastic attitudes 
in terms of the notion of direction of fit. This notion, first applied in the context of 
propositional attitudes by Searle,17 is a commonly acknowledged way to 
distinguish doxastic attitudes from other propositional attitudes, because the 
direction of fit is regarded as the main difference between ‘belief’ and ‘desire,’ the 
two basic (coarse-grained) exemplars of propositional attitudes.18 
In adopting a propositional attitude with a mind-to-world direction of fit 
(for instance, an attitude of belief), an agent aims to match the content of her 
attitude to the external world. In case of a mismatch, it is the content of the 
attitude that should be adapted. Accordingly, these attitudes can be judged to be 
true or false. In adopting a propositional attitude with a world-to-mind direction 
of fit (for instance, an attitude of desire), the agent aspires to match the world to 
the content of her attitude. In case of a mismatch, this cannot be remedied by 
changing the content of the attitude; it is, in a sense, the world that should be 
different. Accordingly, these attitudes can only be judged to be fulfilled or 
unfulfilled. 
I define doxastic attitudes (and, hence, doxastic concepts) to be 
propositional attitudes (or concepts) that satisfy the following criteria: 
(a) they have a mind-to-world direction of fit; 
(b) they have no world-to-mind direction of fit; 
(c) they are defined only in terms of criteria that are internal with respect to the 
agent holding the attitude. 
I have added conditions (2) and (3) to the colloquial definition of a doxastic 
attitude in terms of ‘direction of fit’ in order to exclude both propositional 
attitudes with a double direction of fit (e.g. ‘fearing that p,’ which involves both 
thinking that p is credible (mind-to-world) and wanting that ~p is the case 
(world-to-mind)) as well as attitudes that depend somehow on external criteria 
such as ‘knowing that p’ (for which it is commonly accepted that this implies, at 
least, that p is true; a criterion that is independent of the agent). 
 
                                                                                                                                       
concepts’ are tokens of the type ‘doxastic attitude’); on the other hand, ‘doxastic concepts’ are 
still abstract types of attitudes, while the generic notion ‘doxastic attitude’ is often used to refer 
to the (unspecified) token attitude of a particular agent. 
17 Searle, Intentionality, 7. 
18 Williams, “Belief, Desire and the Praxis of Reasoning,” 124; Oppy, “Propositional attitudes.” 
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3. The Theoretical and the Practical Doxastic Attitude 
By considering the various doxastic concepts, one can observe that in fact they 
specify two different doxastic attitudes. This has already been noted by scholars 
working on the notion of acceptance.19 Given a proposition p and an agent S, I 
define these two attitudes as follows: 
(TDA) the theoretical doxastic attitude: the credence S gives to p or the 
confidence S has in the truth of p. 
The nature of an agent’s theoretical doxastic attitude towards p can be 
found out by asking her: “How likely is it, do you think, that p is true?” Her 
response can vary from the expression of a gut feeling to a fully reasoned answer. 
In any case, the agent’s attitude will be the result of an assessment of the truth of 
p, based on what she regards as relevant evidence for it, and its expression can 
range gradually from an absolute disbelief in p to a total conviction concerning p’s 
truth. 
(PDA) the practical doxastic attitude: the policy S has on trusting p and relying 
on its content. 
The nature of an agent’s practical doxastic attitude can be found out by 
asking her: “In which type of circumstances would you let your reasoning and 
actions depend on this proposition, and in which not?” Her response can vary 
from a vague reference to some archetypical contexts to a precise demarcation 
criterion in terms of a specific property of the circumstances. Accordingly, S’s 
attitude will be the result of an assessment by her of the practical consequences of 
relying on the truth of p, and can range from a willingness to assume p only in 
hypothetical arguments to accepting p under any circumstances. 
In the event that the particular circumstances or context are given, let us 
call them C, the practical doxastic attitude reduces to the following derivative 
attitude: 
(PDAC) the practical doxastic attitude in a context: the policy S has on trusting p 
in the particular context C, i.e. whether or not she relies on p in the context C. 
This time, an agent’s attitude will be the result of a yes-or-no decision as to 
whether she is willing to let her reasoning and actions depend on p in some given 
particular situation. As such, the premises for practical reasoning are constituted 
by the agent’s practical doxastic attitudes in the context at hand. 
                                                                
19 See e.g. Engel, “Trust and the Doxastic Family,” 20-21. 
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Let me add five further clarifications. Where confusion might arise 
concerning which variant of the doxastic attitudes is intended, I will add the 
relevant acronym, namely TDA, PDA or PDAC. 
First, it is clear that given any proposition and any agent, one can construct 
an answer to both of the questions stated in the explanations of (TDA) and (PDA) 
above. Although these answers may be expressed at different levels of detail, it is 
possible to speak both of an agent’s theoretical and of her practical doxastic 
attitude towards a particular proposition. These descriptions are clearly not the 
same thing: the judgment of a proposition’s truth (TDA) can be a very balanced 
report, which is quite independent of the circumstances one finds oneself in at 
that moment. On the other hand, whether one lets one’s reasoning depend on that 
proposition in a particular context (PDAC), is a yes-or-no decision which may 
well turn out differently in different types of circumstances or for different types 
of possible actions. As such, a very subtle policy (PDA) can be generated. 
Second, the demarcation between contexts in which the agent relies on a 
proposition and those in which she does not (PDA) is determined at least by the 
positive consequences the agent foresees in case she is right and the negative ones 
she is willing to accept in case she is mistaken. These consequences, which are 
considered only from the agent’s perspective (in other words, irrespective of the 
actual consequences), can vary a great deal and are often hard to compare. In 
accordance with Bayesian decision theory, the weighted sum of the relevant 
consequences can be called the expected utility for the agent of relying on a 
certain proposition in a certain context. But as it is not needed for our purposes 
that agents actually make such calculations, it suffices to assume that agents can 
compare the consequences they foresee qualitatively. 
Third, the attitudes are defined descriptively without reference to rational 
behavior or to any normative theory. For rational agents, theoretical and practical 
doxastic attitudes are of course related: propositions of which one is fairly 
confident that they are true will be relied on in a wide variety of circumstances, 
while propositions that one suspects of being false will be relied on only in 
contexts in which the penalty of being mistaken is rather low. 
In fact, Bayesian decision theory provides a method for calculating the most 
rational practical doxastic attitude in a certain context (PDAC) given an agent’s 
degrees of belief towards the relevant propositions (a quantitative description of 
her TDA) and (quantified) expected utilities of relying on those propositions in 
that context. However, agents are clearly not always able to perform these 
quantifications and calculations effectively. This explains why in everyday 
circumstances, even if an agent intends to be rational, her theoretical and practical 
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attitudes will sometimes appear to be at odds. Also, even rational agents differ in 
their perceptions of the utilities: two agents having the same degree of confidence 
in a proposition might rely on it differently in similar circumstances. This explains 
why the various folk notions describing doxastic attitudes allow for independent 
descriptions of an agent’s theoretical and practical doxastic attitude towards a 
certain proposition (see Section 4). 
Fourth, the theoretical doxastic attitude resembles what classical 
epistemologists typically have in mind when talking about doxastic attitudes (as it 
reports the agent’s perception of the truth of a proposition). To them, the practical 
doxastic attitude may seem an awkward addition. Yet it is a genuine doxastic 
attitude. For recall the three requirements stipulated in the definition of doxastic 
attitudes. First, the theoretical doxastic attitude clearly has a mind-to-world 
direction of fit: an agent adopts a policy to trust p depending on how she perceives 
the world and what might happen in it, and therefore her policy reflects her 
perception of the world.20 Secondly, there is no world-to-mind direction of fit 
with respect to p: in purely specifying the circumstances in which she trusts p, an 
agent does not express any desire that the world should confirm to the content of 
p. Thirdly, the attitude is defined solely in term of the agent’s internal perception 
of the circumstances, the consequences she herself foresees and her assessment of 
the trustworthiness of the proposition, all of which are criteria internal to her. 
Fifth, it is common to define the philosophical notion of ‘degrees of belief’ 
technically in terms of dispositions to bet, which would reduce the theoretical 
doxastic attitude (TDA) to a mere variation of the practical doxastic attitude 
(PDA). Such an operationalist view, which has proven to be an excellent starting 
point for rational decision theory, is, however, not a problem for the framework I 
am proposing here. My goal is to distinguish two qualitatively distinct human 
modes of assessing a proposition, resulting in two doxastic attitudes, which can be 
independently described in a qualitative way, a distinction that is reflected in the 
various doxastic folk notions (see Section 4). I accept that, for the theoretical 
attitude, it may be possible that humans can only make qualitative comparisons, 
and that, if the attitude needs to be operationalized quantitatively (for use in a 
                                                                
20 To clarify this point, consider the following example: an agent S decides to accept the 
proposition p, having no specified theoretical attitude towards it, for a certain research context 
(a context in which the consequences of being mistaken are negligible). Suppose that during this 
research, S gathers evidence that p is very unlikely. Apart from specifying S’s theoretical 
doxastic attitude towards p, this evidence will also lead S to adapt her practical doxastic attitude: 
S will now accept p in hardly any context (where before she was willing to trust it for research 
contexts). In other words, the agent aims to match her policy (her attitude) to the perceived 
external world. 
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normative theory of decision making), this can probably be done only by equating 
theoretical attitudes (TDA) with practical doxastic attitudes for certain artificial 
and purified contexts (PDAC) such as ‘no strings attached’ bets.21 Yet though it can 
be argued that the quantitative operationalization of the notion ‘degrees of belief’ 
is, in a technical sense, an (artificial) practical doxastic attitude, the notion can still 
be used qualitatively as a primitive doxastic concept to describe the theoretical 
doxastic attitude, as this operationalization is not required for describing various 
folk notions of doxastic attitudes. 
In summary, then, and taking the agent’s evidence to be fixed at a certain 
moment, the theoretical doxastic attitude (TDA) is a context-insensitive doxastic 
attitude that allows for a range of degrees of confidence in the truth of p, while 
the practical doxastic attitude (PDA) is a context-sensitive attitude that reduces to 
a yes-or-no decision in each context (PDAC) depending on the expected utility of 
the two options in that context. For rational agents, these two attitudes towards a 
certain proposition are related, but the nature of this relation depends on how 
each particular agent balances her theoretical appraisal with expected utility. 
4. Three Categories of Doxastic Concepts 
The many known doxastic concepts, such as ‘doubting,’ ‘accepting,’ ‘assuming,’ 
‘having some confidence,’ ‘suspending judgment,’ ‘hypothesizing,’ ‘being certain 
of,’ ‘suspecting’ and ‘believing’ (in its specific and intuitive folk psychological 
meaning) may all be regarded as (partial) descriptions of the nature of either one 
or both of the two doxastic attitudes I have distinguished. 
Of these doxastic concepts, some, such as ‘having a particular degree of 
confidence in (the truth of) p,’ ‘giving p some credit’ or ‘being (un)certain of p’ 
give a clear description of the nature of the theoretical doxastic attitude of the 
agent towards the proposition. They specify up to a certain level of detail how the 
agent judges the truth of p, but give hardly any information about when the agent 
intends to let her reasoning depend on p. For instance, suppose that an agent 
acknowledges that her chances of recovering from a disease are fifty-fifty (TDA). 
In other words, her degree of confidence in the truth of either possibility, of 
recovering or not, is equally large. This information tells us nothing about her 
practical doxastic attitudes (PDA). An optimistic person might base all her 
practical reasoning and actions on the premise that she will recover, while a 
                                                                
21 In real life, winning or losing a bet has not only monetary consequences, but also 
psychological and social ones in the form of joy, sadness, self-confidence boosts or dips, gain or 
loss of social prestige, etc. Therefore, it is hard to call the bet contexts used to define ‘degrees of 
belief’ actual real-life contexts. 
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pessimist might do the opposite. As concepts of this type describe only the 
theoretical doxastic attitude of an agent towards p, they can be called, in short, 
theoretical doxastic concepts. Of these, ‘having a particular degree of confidence 
in the truth of p’ can be regarded as the basic or primitive notion, because it allows 
for a description of any theoretical doxastic attitude by specifying ‘a particular 
degree’ qualitatively. For example, ‘being certain’ means having full confidence, 
while ‘giving some credit’ means that one takes ‘a particular degree’ to mean a 
substantial amount, but generally less than the amount of confidence in the other 
option. 
Other doxastic concepts, such as ‘accepting that p is the case,’ ‘suspending 
judgment as to whether p is the case,’ ‘taking p to be a relevant possibility’ are 
examples of practical doxastic concepts. They indicate the type of circumstances or 
contexts in which the agent will let her reasoning depend on p (or not) (PDA), 
while giving hardly any further information about exactly how much confidence 
the agent has in the truth of p (TDA). For instance, in most circumstances, people 
accept that in general their partner will not lie to them (PDA), but if asked how 
certain they are about this (TDA), some would answer that they have some doubts 
whether this is really the case, while others would be fully confident. 
Similarly, if an agent suspends judgment as to whether p is the case, and 
thus does not rely on p in any context (PDA), one does not know whether, 
theoretically, p or ~p seems more plausible to her (TDA). Of the practical doxastic 
concepts, ‘accepting’ can be considered the primitive notion, because it allows for 
a description of any practical doxastic attitude (PDA) by specifying in which 
contexts the agent accepts the proposition (PDAC). 
Finally, some doxastic concepts, such as ‘believing that p’, ‘doubting 
whether p,’ ‘being ignorant about p’ have both a theoretical and a practical 
meaning, or, in other words, describe to some degree the nature of both the 
agent’s theoretical and practical doxastic attitude towards p. For instance, when an 
agent believes p (in its intuitive folk meaning), we certainly know that she has a 
high degree of confidence in the truth of p (TDA), but we also know (because 
people state their beliefs when prompted to give reasons for their actions) that she 
will be willing to base her practical reasoning on p as a premise in a large range of 
circumstances (PDA). The ambiguity of this notion arises from the fact that one 
can emphasize one part or the other, the theoretical or the practical, as we will see 
in the following sections. 
The remainder of this paper will examine how to understand this dual 
nature, both theoretical and practical, of the folk notion of ‘belief.’ This will be 
done by applying the conceptual framework presented thus far in order to reassess 
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two important debates in epistemology: namely concerning the difference 
between ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance’ and the difference between ‘(plain) beliefs’ and 
‘degrees of belief.’ 
The main goal of this analysis will be to show that ‘belief’ cannot be 
retained as a specific fine-grained primitive doxastic concept (apart from its 
technical coarse-grained meaning). If one tries to capture the intuitive sense of the 
folk notion of belief, one obtains a complex and, hence, secondary notion, 
reducible to a suitable expression of ‘degrees of confidence’ and ‘acceptances.’ I 
will argue that these two concepts are far better suited than ‘belief’ to be 
considered as primitive doxastic concepts, because each of them specifies only one 
of the two doxastic attitudes. Still, precisely because of this dual nature of the folk 
notion of belief, the notion of ‘belief’ can be retained in its coarse-grained 
philosophical sense, as denoting any doxastic attitude (either practically or 
theoretically) that assents to its content, as long as one takes care to specify the 
attitude more precisely in detailed philosophical analysis. 
5. Belief and Acceptance 
The notion ‘acceptance’ was introduced by Van Fraassen to describe the attitude 
of scientists towards their most empirically adequate theories.22 According to him, 
acceptance of a theory does not necessarily entail that one believes it,23 yet at the 
same time encompasses more than belief, because the attitude of acceptance has 
the pragmatic dimension of commitment to a theory, which is a question not of 
truth but of usefulness.24 
Given the importance of the notion of acceptance in general and its 
difference from belief, it soon became a research topic for epistemology. The most 
influential epistemological account to date has been given by Cohen, who defines 
acceptance of p as having or adopting 
[...] a policy of deeming, positing or postulating that p – i.e. of including that 
proposition or rule among one’s premises for deciding what to do or think in a 
particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true that p.25 
Cohen further states that acceptance, unlike belief, is more or less under an 
agent’s voluntary control26 and acknowledges implicitly that acceptance is a 
                                                                
22 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 4. 
23 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 9, 46. 
24 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 88. 




context-dependent notion.27 These two characteristics are also stressed by other 
authors such as Bratman28 and Engel.29 Engel further holds that, while truth is the 
criterion for evaluating beliefs, utility is the criterion for acceptances.30 A final 
explanation of the distinction between these two notions is given by Lehrer, who 
approaches the topic from a somewhat different point of view. According to him, 
belief is a first-order doxastic state, while acceptance is a second-order 
‘metamental’ state based on a reflective evaluation of one’s first-order beliefs.31 Yet 
I am tempted here to follow Engel, who notes that Lehrer’s account neglects the 
important pragmatic aspect of acceptance as well as the idea of trust, which is 
inherent in the notion.32 Therefore, I do regard acceptance as a first-order attitude 
having propositions as its content, not beliefs. Yet this does not prevent one from 
regarding beliefs, in the spirit of Lehrer’s view, as constitutive in the formation of 
one’s acceptances. If the acceptance towards a proposition is consciously formed 
(by e.g. applying a kind of decision theory), this decision will clearly have taken 
into account beliefs about this proposition and related ones, such as the foreseen 
consequences of particular actions.  
Using the framework introduced in this paper, it seems at first sight possible 
to describe the distinction between these two notions as the difference between a 
theoretical doxastic concept (‘belief’) and a practical one (‘acceptance’). Of the four 
contrasting features between beliefs and acceptances that are pointed out in the 
literature, the context-sensitivity of acceptances (and practical doxastic attitudes 
in general) and utility as their evaluation criterion have already been discussed in 
previous sections. The other two contrasting features relate to the fact that an 
agent’s practical doxastic attitude (PDAC) can be the result of a decision. Given 
that such a decision takes into account the agent’s theoretical doxastic attitude 
(TDA), among other things such as an assessment of the circumstances, it can be 
understood why acceptances are more under an agent’s voluntary control and 
influenced by her theoretical doxastic attitudes.  
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Notwithstanding the prima facie plausibility of this first analysis of the 
distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance,’ Frankish argues convincingly that 
distinguishing these attitudes as such – in our framework, considering belief as a 
theoretical doxastic concept and acceptance as a practical one – is problematic, 
because it “suggests that acceptance is not a form of belief at all, but a wholly 
different attitude.”33 He agrees that there are acceptances that are not beliefs, but 
maintains that “it would be perverse to claim that none of them are.”34 In other 
words, people do believe some (if not most) of the states present in their conscious 
practical reasoning. 
Frankish’s concern is a genuine one. It may be pointed out in response that 
regarding beliefs and acceptances as distinct attitudes does not imply that an agent 
could not hold both of them towards a single proposition. But the fact that beliefs 
can serve as premises even if no form of decision theory or other form of conscious 
consideration is applied suggests that the adoption of a new belief must in itself 
directly imply the acceptance of this newly believed proposition for certain 
circumstances. In other words, acceptance for certain circumstances is part of the 
meaning of the attitude of believing, such that the folk notion of ‘belief’ cannot be 
a purely theoretical doxastic concept. 
Frankish explains this problem by classifying plain beliefs as a subspecies of 
acceptances, i.e. those that are “epistemically motivated and unrestricted as to 
context.”35 His explanation, however, seems at least a little awkward, because 
context-dependency is an inherent feature of Cohen’s definition of acceptance, 
which Frankish himself embraces. Frankish’s idea of unrestrictedness as to context 
implies that a belief can serve as a premise for practical reasoning in any context. 
But if a believed proposition may be considered a true premise in any context, this 
is the same, it seems, as adopting a policy of trusting the belief in any context: for 
there is no longer any demarcation between contexts in which one can trust the 
belief and those in which one cannot. This view is hugely problematic. Kaplan, 
who calls it the act view, argues that it is fallacious36 – a fact of which Frankish is 
aware37 – because agents are not certain of their beliefs. Hence, they will, for 
example, not bet on the truth of their beliefs if the stakes are too high, even if they 
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are fully convinced. The act view would instruct them to always trust their belief 
and accept any bet. 
The initial explanation of the distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance,’ 
outlined above, can be modified as follows in order to cope with Frankish’s 
concern. ‘Acceptance’ is, as noted, a purely practical doxastic concept, but the folk 
notion of ‘belief’ actually has both a theoretical and a practical meaning. On the 
one hand, it means that an agent has at least a rather high degree of confidence in 
the truth of the proposition. Exactly how high need not be numerically 
expressible, but a decent amount that is clearly larger that the amount of 
confidence in the opposite proposition is always minimally implied. On the other 
hand, it also means that the agent is willing to base her practical reasoning on this 
proposition in at least all contexts where the negative consequences in case she is 
mistaken seem acceptable to her.38 This includes contexts where she cannot or 
does not assess these consequences, but where she has no reason to think that 
much depends on whether she trusts this proposition or not.  
Keeping this in mind, one can identify the well-known examples in the 
literature on ‘acceptance,’ in which an agent does not act or reason on her beliefs, 
as contexts where these negative consequences are unacceptable for the agent. 
Consider the following example, often cited and originally developed by Cohen:39 
an attorney accepts that her client is innocent in the context of a particular trial, 
even though her own belief is that he is guilty. She does not accept her own belief 
in the context of the trial because the negative consequences of acting on that 
belief are unacceptable in this context, not only for her personal career but also, 
and more importantly, for the social institution of the judicial system. In contexts 
where the negative consequences of accepting her own belief are not so 
prominent, for example when she talks about the case with her husband/wife, the 
attorney might express and reason upon her own belief. 
In conclusion, the folk notion of ‘belief’ describes the nature of both the 
theoretical and the practical attitude of an agent towards a certain proposition, 
and should therefore be handled with care. This double meaning – on the one 
hand, having a sufficiently high degree of confidence in the proposition’s truth 
(TDA), and on the other, being willing to rely on it in at least all contexts where 
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the consequences of being mistaken seem to be acceptable (PDA) – also explains 
the diverging views one finds in the debate about ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance,’ because 
it is possible to lay the emphasis more on the theoretical or on the practical aspect 
of belief. When Van Fraassen, Cohen and others try to identify the differences 
between acceptances and beliefs, they appeal to intuitions about the theoretical 
meaning of ‘belief,’ a meaning which ‘acceptance’ lacks. But when Frankish 
rightly points out that some acceptances actually are beliefs, he appeals to existing 
intuitions about the practical meaning of ‘belief.’ 
6. Belief, Degrees of Belief and the Bayesian Challenge 
The conceptual framework of this paper and the double meaning of the folk 
notion of belief can also help explain the distinction between the concepts ‘(plain) 
belief’ and ‘partial belief,’ the attitude of having a particular degree of confidence 
or degree of belief in a proposition, as well as the requirement put on any 
explication of this distinction by the Bayesian Challenge. This is the name given 
by Kaplan40 to a problem that has been formulated in various ways by different 
authors; see for example Jeffrey41 for an early formulation and Frankish42 for a 
fairly recent one. Let us consider Frankish’s formulation here. As he writes: 
Bayesian decision theory teaches us that the rational way to make decisions is to 
assign degrees of probability and desirability to the various possible outcomes of 
candidate actions and then choose the one that offers the best trade-off of 
desirability and likely success. [...] How can flat-out belief and desire have the 
psychological importance they seem to have, given their apparent irrelevance to 
rational action?43 
It is my own view, and the view of the authors who have formulated the 
Bayesian Challenge, that any account of the relation between plain belief and 
degrees of belief must also give a satisfying answer to this challenge. Generally 
speaking, three strategies to specify the relation between ‘plain belief’ and ‘partial 
belief’ are discernible in the literature. 
A first strategy, and the one that has been most extensively explored, is 
what Foley has called the Lockean Thesis: 
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To say that we believe a proposition is just to say that we are sufficiently 
confident of its truth for our attitude to be one of belief.44 
Yet this strategy, which, in our framework, identifies ‘believing that p’ as a 
theoretical doxastic concept and defines it in terms of a threshold for the degree of 
belief in p, faces two severe threats.  
First, this strategy has to cope with the famous lottery45 and preface46 
paradoxes, which show that the Lockean thesis can yield inconsistent beliefs when 
combined with the aggregation principle for beliefs (which states that the 
conjunction of two beliefs is also a belief). These paradoxes are typically met by 
softening or qualifying the aggregation principle,47 but this is generally done by 
introducing some context-sensitivity, which is hard to bring into accordance with 
the idea that degrees of belief (to which beliefs can, according to the Lockean 
thesis, be reduced) are, like all theoretical doxastic concepts, defined independent 
of context.48 
Second, this strategy also fails to meet the Bayesian Challenge, given that 
this challenge to explain the psychological importance of plain beliefs appeals 
particularly to intuitions of ‘belief’ as a practical doxastic concept. Theoretically, 
there may be a very minimal difference between an acquired belief and a 
proposition that falls just short of the threshold for belief, as degrees of belief are 
considered to be on a continuous scale. The Bayesian view perfectly explains how 
even a small difference in this regard can lead to widely divergent decisions based 
on this belief. It cannot explain, however, why agents, once they have acquired a 
belief, tend to take it into account in the most diverse situations, even situations to 
which the acquired belief is only marginally significant. This behavior can only be 
understood if we assume that an agent does not run a full Bayesian analysis for any 
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decision but simply adopts a policy to start relying on a belief in a large set of 
contexts once she has acquired it.  
A second common strategy to specify the relation between ‘(plain) belief’ 
and ‘partial belief’ is to regard ‘plain belief’ as a kind of behavioral disposition 
arising from an agent’s partial beliefs, e.g. a disposition to assert the belief as a 
proposition49 or to accept it.50 These strategies identify belief solely as a practical 
doxastic concept. However, while this identification may meet the Bayesian 
Challenge, it fails to accord with our common (theoretical) intuitions about the 
context-insensitivity of beliefs. As long as there are no changes in the evidence an 
agent perceives, she will likely suppose that her beliefs hold in any context she 
may find herself in, while a characterization of ‘belief’ as a practical doxastic 
concept requires – to avoid the pitfall of the aforementioned act view – that one 
limits the set of circumstances in which the belief holds. 
Finally, some authors, such as Bratman51 and Jeffrey,52 seem implicitly to 
deny the existence of plain beliefs and reduce them in every case either to a 
degree of belief or to an acceptance in certain contexts.  
To implement this third strategy explicitly seems to me the best proposal. 
The intuitive folk notion of belief entails both, theoretically, that the agent has a 
sufficiently high context-insensitive degree of confidence in the truth of the 
proposition and, practically, that the agent has adopted a policy of relying on this 
proposition in at least all circumstances where the consequences of being mistaken 
seem acceptable to her. 
This duality in the meaning of the notion can give rise to ambiguity, hence 
making it unfit for the philosophical analysis of doxastic concepts. Consider again 
some of the examples described above, which pop up in the literature. Take the 
attorney who believes that her client is actually guilty: does this mean that, 
although the attorney is quite confident about her client’s guilt (TDA), she 
practically bases all her reasoning on his innocence (PDA)? Or does it mean that, 
except for her public appearances in court, she reasons on the basis of his guilt to 
determine her strategy (PDA)? Or consider another example, of a woman who 
believes that her husband/wife is not cheating on her. Does this just mean that she 
takes this to be the case without questioning it (PDA), although she has to admit 
that she cannot be fully certain (TDA)? Or does it mean that she is also 
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wholeheartedly confident about it (TDA)? Clearly, the notion of ‘belief’ is not 
precise enough to describe the particular attitudes in these examples.  
In light of these considerations, it seems clear that we can gain precision in 
our analyses of doxastic concepts by replacing any fine-grained specific concept of 
‘belief’ with the more precise and primitive concepts of ‘degrees of confidence’ 
and ‘acceptance,’ for using the latter concepts makes it possible to clarify whether 
the theoretical, the practical or both attitudes are meant. Still, when agents report 
on their doxastic attitudes towards p, the attitudes of ‘having a high degree of 
confidence in p’ and ‘being willing to rely on p if the negative consequences seem 
acceptable’ are often present together. Therefore, I see no problem in retaining the 
folk notion of ‘belief’ as a somewhat ambiguous but sufficiently clear shorthand to 
denote both attitudes in daily life. Also, precisely because of its rather broad 
meaning, ‘belief’ in a coarse-grained sense can be retained as a technical concept 
referring to any doxastic concept that expresses an attitude of assent to its content. 
In detailed philosophical analysis, however, much precision can be gained by 
eliminating altogether the idea that there exists a specific and unambiguous fine-
grained doxastic notion of ‘belief.’ 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have shown that, in the literature on ‘doxastic attitudes’, the 
notion of ‘belief’ is used both in a coarse-grained sense to indicate any doxastic 
attitude that indicates assent towards a proposition, and in a more specific, fine-
grained sense to be contrasted with other doxastic concepts such as ‘acceptance’ or 
‘having a specific degree of belief.’ I have argued that, while the coarse-grained 
meaning of ‘belief’ is technically sound and useful for philosophical analysis, the 
fine-grained meaning, which draws on the intuitive folk notion of belief, is utterly 
ambiguous.  
In order to dispel this ambiguity, I have presented a new framework for 
describing fine-grained doxastic attitudes which is not reliant on a specific and 
intuitively clear fine-grained concept of ‘belief.’ In this framework, I distinguish 
between an agent’s theoretical doxastic attitude (her credence in p) and her 
practical doxastic attitude (her policy on trusting p to be used as a premise for her 
practical reasoning). Given this distinction, all well-known doxastic concepts can 
be placed into one of three categories: theoretical doxastic concepts (of which 
‘having a certain degree of confidence’ is the primitive notion), practical doxastic 
concepts (of which ‘acceptance’ is the primitive notion) and doxastic concepts that 
describe both attitudes, such as the folk notion of ‘belief.’  
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After introducing this framework, I have argued for a reductionist stance 
concerning the idea of an unambiguous and specific fine-grained notion of ‘belief’ 
and showed that much precision can be gained in philosophical analysis by using a 
suitable combination of ‘degrees of belief’ and ‘acceptances’ whenever the folk 
notion of ‘belief’ is intended. 
The applications of this new framework need not, and should not, be 
restricted to the analysis of ‘belief’. An interesting question for further research is 
whether this framework can provide us with insights into the specific nature of 
other important doxastic concepts, such as ‘entertaining a hypothesis,’ ‘suspending 
judgment’ or various forms of ignorance. Furthermore, it needs to be investigated 
whether this reductionist stance on a specific fine-grained notion of belief might 
also give us more precision in other epistemological debates that rely heavily on 
the notion of belief, such as debates about rationality, justification and the theory 
of knowledge. 
 
